

VASILE CUCERESCU*

The Eastern Borders of the European Union in the Field of Migration

Migration is a dignity seeking journey
*Francois Crepeau***

Abstract

The paper explores the characteristics and the significance of the European Union's eastern border in regular and irregular migration processes considering that migration is on the top of the European Union's agenda as well as of the United Nations. It focuses on problematic and positive aspects of migration issues at the eastern border of the European Union. The investigation pays attention to European acts on migration policy and law, eastern border countries and neighbours of the European Union; it analyses dimensions of the European Union's eastern border, migration challenges of the eastern border route, enhancement of migration management at the eastern border through the use of diverse instruments such as the European neighbourhood policy, the Eastern Partnership, the European Union–Russia relations, the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy and the Eastern Borders' Risk Analysis Network. Migration at the eastern border of the European Union is also marked by the concepts of "Schlechtere Grenzen" and "Rechtsgrenzen". The results and conclusions point out relevant issues that are peculiar to the eastern border of the European Union in terms of migration challenges and migration management.

Key words: European Union, EU eastern borders, eastern migration route, migration management.

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* European Community Studies Association Moldova, vasile.cucerescu@gmail.com

** Professor of International Law, McGill University and United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants (2011–2017).

Introduction

Human migration has evolved at high rates in scope and complexity by affecting countries all over the world, including the European Union and its Member States. Migration is on the agenda due to its connection to development, and both are considered together as a complex equation. Even if it is difficult to establish a clear-cut relationship between migration-development causes and effects, some links can be identified by considering the importance of labour force, the impact of remittances, the place and the role of highly skilled migrants, the issues on human rights, especially of female and child migrants and potential climate changes. As a UN report reads, international commitments to migration problems have been reluctant considering “(i) a lack of national data and indicators, (ii) migration being a fragmented portfolio falling under the responsibility of various government departments and (iii) migration being a politically sensitive issue, often leading to a focus on border management and control rather than international development” (IOM, UNDESA 2012: 11). In large it follows Ernst Georg Ravenstein’s laws on human migration which were elaborated a long time ago and state that migration generates counter migration; there are urban and rural differences in migration; migration and technology are interrelated; migration is an economic condition. As shown the world has not changed too much in the way it is perceiving and addressing migration.

The European Union faces challenges both at intra- and external community levels in terms of migration. If intra-level migration is regulated and the freedom of movement works, on the one hand, immigration still would have the characteristics of the Achilles’ heel, on the other hand, Member States would display divergent visions on it, irrespective of the quantity, the quality and the geographical routes.

It is worth mentioning that migration flow numbers through *Eastern Borders Route* are lower in comparison to other routes, speaking about legal and illegal movement of people to the European Union. However, this numeric illusion hides behind it two important aspects: the *challenging aspect* refers to sophisticated methods used by migrating networks and the *positive aspect* is characterized by qualitative border management monitoring. The concern is the challenging aspect comprising of migrants’ countries of origin and transit (sometimes it is quite difficult or impossible to make a clear distinction between countries of origin and transit due to cultural, linguistic heritage in the East or fraudulent documents). For instance, out of the 997 total number of illegal crossings between January–December 2018, among top 5

migrants' countries of origin are identified the following: Vietnam (370), Iraq (90), Russia (82), Ukraine (82) and Turkey (66), according to Frontex data. But the list of the countries is much longer (for the same year): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Congo Democratic Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United States, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Western Sahara and Yemen.

The picture is quite diverse; and each migration case has behind it its own story. There are nationalities from all continents and from about 70 countries; this data are not to be neglected. Detections of illegal border crossings are very relevant for migration flows. This diversity leads to the conclusion that migration networks for this route are more active and competitive.

Taking into account the aforementioned aspects, the paper aims to examine EU policy acts, data and indicators on migration, referring to the eastern border of the European Union, near and not quite near neighbours in the eastern migration route, specific characteristics of migration processes at EU eastern border, and external measures meaning to regulate migration. The topic is motivated by the fact that the migration threat at the eastern border of the European Union seems to be too exaggerated in comparison with other existing migration routes. Data and indicators demonstrate that the degree of migration threat at the eastern border of the European Union is much lower than expected. The methods adopted to argue this are: description and analysis of legal acts of the European Union towards migration at the eastern border of the European Union; content analysis of studies and data concerning migration at the eastern border of the European Union; quantitative and qualitative analysis of migration data and indicators at the eastern border of the European Union; processing and interpretation of collected legal acts, data and indicators with impact on the eastern border of the European Union; and finally formulation of relevant and pertinent conclusions on the migration process at the eastern border of the European Union.

1. European Union Acts on Migration Policy and Law

The European Union has shared competence in matters of migration. There are many elaborated acts in the European Union that refer to regular and irregular migration issues with the aim of extending better control over incoming flows of people. The primary legal basis and competences of the European Union in migration are in the articles 79 and 80 of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union* (TFEU). Article 79 (ex Article 63, points 3 and 4, TEC) reads:

1. “The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the following areas:
 - (a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of family reunification;
 - (b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States;
 - (c) illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation;
 - (d) combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
3. The Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to their countries of origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not or who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory of one of the Member States.
4. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.

5. This Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed” (TFEU 78–79).

Further article 80 reads: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle” (TFEU 79).

Later on, developments in primary law appeared. Two strategic acts need to be mentioned. The first, *the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility* establishes four pillars of the EU’s relations with third countries on regular immigration and mobility, irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximising the impact of migration and mobility on development (GAMM 2011). And the second, the *European Agenda on Migration* – stands for saving lives at sea, targeting criminal smuggling networks, responding to high-volumes of arrivals within the European Union, a common approach to granting protection to displaced persons in need of protection, working in partnership with third countries to tackle migration upstream, using the European Union’s tools to help frontline Member States. It also proposes measures in four policy areas: reducing incentives for irregular immigration, border management (saving lives and securing external borders), developing a stronger common asylum policy and establishing a new policy on regular immigration (EAM 2015).

A lot of legislative developments for regular immigration, integration, irregular immigration appeared recently: the first implementation package (2015) – on relocation, resettlement, action plan against migrant smuggling, fingerprinting, the future of the Blue Card Directive, new operational plan for Triton operation; the second implementation package (2015) – relocating 120 000 asylum seekers from Italy, Greece and Hungary to other EU countries, a permanent crisis relocation mechanism under the Dublin system, a European list of safe countries of origin, action plan on return, return handbook, procurement rules for refugee support measures, addressing the external dimension of the refugee crisis, a Trust Fund for Africa; Communication on Managing the refugee crisis (2015); Communication on Managing the refugee crisis: state of play (2015); managing the refugees crisis (2015) – European travel document for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, hotspots in Greece, hotspots in Italy, temporary suspension of Sweden’s obligations under the EU relocation mechanism, voluntary humanitarian admission scheme with Turkey; smart borders, asylum and legal migration (2016); the first

report on EU–Turkey statement (2016); managing the refugee crisis (2016) – state of play, Common European Asylum System: Dublin reform, Common European Asylum System: Eurodac, Common European Asylum System: EASO, Schengen, visa liberalisation; the third report on relocation and resettlement (2016); legal migration and integration (2016); managing the refugee crisis (2017); back to Schengen (2017); adapting the common visa policy to new challenges (2018); managing the refugee crisis (2018); visa information system (2018); European network of immigration liaison officers (2018); solidarity and management of migration flows (2018); Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and Internal Security Fund (2018); EU budget for the future (2018); Kosovo – visa liberalisation roadmap (2018); managing migration (2018); state of the Union 2018 (2018); visa policy (2018); managing migration in all its aspects (2018); visa reciprocity (2018); visa liberalisation (2018); managing migration (2019).

As noticeable migration policy is a crucial issue on political agenda of EU institutions. The puzzle of harmonization (Givens and Luedtke 2004) still raises concerns in the national-supranational dialogue of competences and in the control-integration perspectives of immigration in the European Union.

Regulatory packages on migration refer to problem-based aspects. However, specific references to the EU’s eastern borders are few. On the other hand, Elizabeth Collett, EU expert in migration and immigrant integration policy, considers it imperative to “invest in leadership”, “improve coordination”, “invest in human resources”, “develop end-to-end monitoring and evaluation processes”, “identify and utilize benchmarks for success that meet practical – and not just formal – standards and take specific, national contexts into account” (Collett 2015: 11) in order to produce stronger and more effective outcomes in the migration area.

2. European Union Eastern Border Countries and Neighbours

Even if the EU acts regulate migration policy very well, there are many issues related to immigration and the eastern border is not an exception.

EU border care follows the principle of hard borders, “immigration controls are no longer limited to the continent’s territorial frontiers but extend both inside and outside the continent” (Carr 2012). The *hard border controls* may include:

- strict controls at EU borders, specialized detention centres across and beyond the European Union;
- pertinent ‘post-entry’ policies;
- ‘upstream’ controls by detecting unwanted immigrants before entering the European Union;
- neighbourhood partnerships by involving these countries in ‘externalized’ border controls of the European Union.

What are the *bordering countries* and *neighbours* in the *East*? The total eastern external border of the European Union is 5699 km in length. From the North to the South, the European Union has borderlines with Russia (Finland–Russia, Estonia–Russia, Latvia–Russia, Lithuania–Russia, Poland–Russia), Belarus (Latvia–Belarus, Lithuania–Belarus, Poland–Belarus), Ukraine (Poland–Ukraine, Slovakia–Ukraine, Hungary–Ukraine, Romania–Ukraine), and Moldova (Romania–Moldova).

Table 1: Eastern Borderlines of the European Union in km

Land boundaries	Russia	Belarus	Ukraine	Moldova	Total
Finland	1 309				1 309
Estonia	324				324
Latvia	332	161			493
Lithuania	261	640			901
Poland	210	418	535		1 163
Slovakia			97		97
Hungary			128		128
Romania			601	683	1 284
Total	2 436	1 219	1 361	683	5 699

Source: *Central Intelligence Agency 2019*.

The longest borderline is with Russia, then comes Ukraine and Belarus. And the shortest one is with Moldova. Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are members of EU Eastern Partnership together with other three countries in the Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The eastern border of the European Union represents a space of interrelated ethnic groups on both sides that are connected linguistically, culturally, and historically. Moreover, this part of Eastern Europe was the western border of the ex-Soviet space. As a consequence of historical changes, the eastern border of the European Union

may be seen as a door to larger Europe by Central Asian countries as well, if we refer only to illegal border crossings.

Is it all quiet on the eastern border of the European Union? What does the border divide?

3. Dimensions of Eastern Borders

The eastern border of the European Union is not just an ordinary border, it is a very complex border that can be viewed from political, cultural, civilizational and geopolitical perspectives as the border closes a space and creates differences on both sides due to its nature as a barrier. It is also a meeting point for some and others in the dialogue of border crossings.

The *political border* is between state entities, i.e. between the European Union and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

As regards the *cultural border* it is extremely complicated to make a clear delimitation, considering that the political borders do not always correspond to identity/linguistic borders. Today's borders were shaped as the result of the Second World War. For instance, there are Finns living in North-Western Russia; Poles living in Belarus and Ukraine; Romanians, Hungarians and Slovaks living in Ukraine; Moldova, the second Romanian state, is outside the European Union; there are Russians living in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The *civilizational border* refers to interactions between the worlds with specific (different) stages of social development. For many, the eastern border of the European Union means the end of Europe, in other words, the border between civilizations.

Throughout history, the East was considered of "the barbarians", "the Mongols" or "the Russians", for example. Or in the vision of the Antiquity, the division between "the civilized world" and "the uncivilized world" that has lost its validity due to imprecise cultural borders, displaced people (of the Russians to the West, e.g. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and re-moved borders (by the Soviets to the West as well, e.g. Belarus, Ukraine and innumerable annexations of Moldova).

The major concern is if the eastern border of the European Union would become a new wall, a new curtain between divided people in the East of Europe, as it is closely connected to dramatically different standards of living which will make migration persist for a long time.

The *geopolitical border* is seemingly to correspond to eastern border of the European border as “from the point of view of history and international relations, the analysis of border provides a very rich field for geopolitical expression in the area of Eastern Europe” (Marcu 2009: 410).

The eastern border of the European Union is a bridge between two geopolitical projects: Euro-Atlantic (the EU and the USA) and Euro-Asiatic (Russia). It is the most sensitive border of the European Union from the geopolitical point of view, supplemented by the cultural point of view, considering the division (fragmentation) of nations that live on both sides of the borders. It is worth mentioning that this fragmentation concerns (reaches) all border nations: Finns, Russians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Belarusians, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians and Romanians. The most delicate situation is that of the Romanians living in two Romanian states (Romania and Moldova) and as a significant ethnic minority in Ukraine.

4. Migration Challenges on the Eastern Borders Route

According to Frontex, the map of migratory routes of the European Union is as follows: Western Mediterranean route, Central Mediterranean route, Eastern Mediterranean route, Western Balkans route and Eastern Borders route. The Eastern Borders route has specific challenges for border management.

The scale of *irregular migration* at eastern borders is much smaller than at other routes. The dynamics of illegal border crossings show reduced numbers in comparison to other migration routes: for instance, in 2008 – 1335, in 2009 – 1050, in 2010 – 1050, in 2011 – 1050, in 2012 – 1600, in 2013 – 1300, in 2014 – 1275, in 2015 – 1927, in 2016 – 1384, in 2017 – 872, and in 2018 – 1084 (the numbers are fair balanced excepting the pick of the crisis in 2015). Only a quarter of irregular immigrants are from eastern neighbouring countries (Frontex 2019a); others are from worldwide, especially from the Community of Independent States and Asian countries. Most of them crossed Polish-Ukrainian and Romanian-Ukrainian borders. For example, non-regional migrants from Afghanistan and Vietnam crossed the borders illegally. The route for Afghans was Hungarian-Ukrainian border and for the Vietnamese was the Latvian-Russian border. The Arctic route between Finland and Russia is also used by non-regional migrants, usually Afghans and Syrians.

What is more common for the eastern borders route is the *abuse of legal travel channels* rather than illegal crossings, chiefly by citizens of the Community of Independent States.

A significant challenge of the Eastern Borders route is *smuggling of excise goods*: cigarettes, alcohol, fuel and stolen cars (Frontex 2019a).

If we consider immigrants from the East (EaP, Russia and Central Asia), they are *economic migrants*. The most immigrants from the East (EaP, Russia and Central Asia) reside in Germany and Italy, followed by Spain, Poland, Czechia and the Baltic states. The top countries of origin are Russia and Ukraine with more than half of all immigrants (Dudzinska, Godzimirski, Parkes 2015). Another important migration issue is the *naturalization* process that is explained by pecuniary reasons.

Since 2016 the Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) has been operating under the EU funded Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management Capacity Building Project after all Eastern Partnership countries joined this initiative (Eastern Partnership members are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; EU Member States and Schengen associates are: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). It performs regular exchanges of statistical data and information on migration issues in order to identify existing problems and emerging trends. *Inter alia*, the Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) addresses seven key indicators for irregular migration (but not limited to them, when required):

- detections of illegal border crossing between BCPs;
- detections of illegal border crossing at BCPs;
- refusals of entry;
- detections of illegal stay;
- asylum applications;
- detections of facilitators;
- detections of fraudulent documents (Frontex 2018).

For exemplification of the exchange of statistical data between the Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) during January–March 2018, the summary of selected EB-RAN indicators is presented below.

The numbers for above indicators are quite diverse for eastern borders and all EU borders. The numbers of the Eastern Borders route for such indicators as facilitators, illegal border crossings between BCPs, persons using fraudulent documents, applications for asylum, illegal stay are extremely insignificant at EU level. The only exception in the table is the indicator of refusals of entry that equals about 30% for quota on Eastern Partnership countries. Consequently, Eastern Partnership countries

represent a lower risk to the European Union in migration area than other parts of the world.

Table 2: Indicators of irregular migration

Indicator	EU Totals	EU MS (eastern land borders only)	% of EU Total	Only EaP Countries
Facilitators	2 542	5	0.2	17
Clandestine entries	970	15	1.5	:
Illegal border crossings between BCPs	20 422	112	0.5	:
Persons using fraudulent documents	4 755	719	1.5	187
Applications for asylum	103 621	2 705	2.6	234
Illegal stay	87 402	4 848	5.5	:
Effective returns	36 450	8 355	23.0	:
Returns decision issued	61 678	10 747	17.0	:
Refusals of entry	45 367	22 104	49.0	13 821

Source: *Frontex 2018*.

In the *Risk Analysis for 2019*, Frontex reviews the development of migration in 2019 and the next years under three pillars: the *likely* (prevention activities by transit countries determine arrivals in the European Union, border management will continue to be tested, systematic border checks will require further resources); the *possible* (sub-Saharan migrants could lead to new record in arrivals in the European Union, exodus from Syria's Idlib region could trigger a new uncontrollable migration wave, migratory pressure from Central and South America); the *unknown* (incomplete information, threats of terrorism-related movements) just to highlight the most important directions (Frontex 2019: 38–39).

Even the numbers at the Eastern Borders route are not so dramatic, however, they deserve to be carefully considered in connection to the identified risk areas within the pillars of the likely, the possible and the unknown, because the evolution could change in any direction due to new factors that influence migration.

Speaking about the future of migration, in 2018 a report on international migration drivers was published. It stated that the likely development of future migration trends is applicable to the Eastern Borders route as well. Among the implications for the evolution of migration, Fabrizio Natale suggests likely future migration drivers: economic drivers in countries of origin; economic drivers in countries of destination; demography; geographical distance, trade and globalisation; network effects; new

forms of international mobility; climate change; policies (Natale 2018). Shifts in migration paradigm can occur and are likely to modify these in the future.

5. Enhancement of Migration Management at European Union Eastern Borders

European Union migration policy has both *internal* and *external dimensions*. *External dimension* may refer to countries of origin, transit countries and reasons for migration. Migration management, alongside with other policy areas, belongs to a larger array of cooperation instruments between the European Union and its neighbours in Eastern Europe (including neighbours of the neighbours).

Migration management approach – characterized by intergovernmental cooperation (*focus*), a normal process in a globalizing world (*perception* of migration), being proactive (*key aim*) and a more holistic approach including development and human rights (*key notion*) – has been widely applied by the European Union in its wider eastern neighbourhood with the help of a couple of bilateral and multilateral instruments of cooperation. This “can be explained by the EU’s disregard for local circumstances in its efforts to establish a unified management approach meant to deal with a wide spectrum of concerns about migration” (Sotkasiira 2016: 138).

In this respect, the European Union has developed specific policy initiatives of cooperation among which arrest our attention the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership Policy and the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, seemingly to address properly the issue under discussion.

European Neighbourhood Policy. The scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) resides in bringing closer the European Union and its neighbours by pursuing mutual interests and benefits. The *focus* is on supporting *stability, security* and *prosperity* in the neighbourhood. Geographically it includes eastern neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and south neighbours (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia).

At the same time, the document contains *express provisions* on *migration* as well as: a neighbourhood policy for a European Union acting coherently and efficiently in the world (ENP, 6), economic and social development policy (ENP, 14), justice and home affairs (ENP, 17), regional cooperation on the EU eastern borders, *inter alia*, in the framework of the “Söderköping Process” (ENP, 21) and the Mediterranean

(ENP, 23). The European neighbourhood policy was revised once in 2015. Even if the initiative is in force, there are some voices speaking about the *obsolescence* of the European neighbourhood policy (Blockmans 2017).

Eastern Partnership. Regional engagement is based on the Eastern Partnership joint initiative (launched in 2009), as an extension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which aims at *deepening* and *strengthening cooperation relations* between the European Union, its Member States and six Eastern and South-Eastern neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Cooperation between partners is set on four key *priority areas*: *economic development and market opportunities*; *strengthening institutions and good governance*; *connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate changes*; *mobility and people-to-people contacts*.

Eastern Partnership countries signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements at an early stage; only with Belarus this initiative was suspended. Three Eastern Partnership countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – have Association Agreements in force. Armenia gave up on signing the Association Agreement with the European Union at the last minute.

Moreover, a follow-up *Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables for 2020* act establishes priority activities for the Eastern Partnership countries to accomplish *concrete tangible results* for citizens on existing commitments by horizontal deliverables, stronger economy, stronger governance, stronger connectivity, stronger society. These deliverables addressed to the Eastern Partnership countries comply with migration management approach and are seen as very practical measures of ‘externalized’ migration tools.

EU–Russia. Relations between the European Union and Russia have developed sinuously over time. In the 1990s, Russia was the first ex-Soviet member that signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union. The agreement was prolonged, but later suspended due to deteriorating relations. This explains somehow fragile bilateral cooperation in migration management.

EUGS. *The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy* (EUGS), a very ambitious strategy on global issues, is likely to answer to the challenge of “the rings of fire” around the European Union and beyond, including the migration management approach. The EUGS refers to such values as peace, security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order (part 1); principles as unity, engagement, responsibility and partnership (part 2); five priorities: 1) the security, 2) state and societal resilience to East and South (with a special sub-priority on a more effective

migration policy), 3) an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, 4) cooperative regional orders, 5) global governance (part 3); and the way from vision to action (part 4).

Moreover, the EUGS includes express provisions on migration that underline the importance of the migration management approach. In part 1, *values*, migration is appears in *democracy* section (EUGS 15). In part 2, *principles*, migration is referred to in *engagement* section (EUGS 17). In part 3, *priorities*, migration is granted more space in *priority 2* and *priority 4*. *Priority 2, state and societal resilience to East and South*, sub-priority *enlargement policy*, recognizes, among other things, that migration challenges are shared pleading for cooperation and wellbeing of citizens (EUGS 24-25). The sub-priority *resilience in surrounding regions* states that joined-up approach towards migration policy will be adopted by the European Union (EUGS 26). The special sub-priority on *a more effective migration policy* tackles the focus is on building resilience in origin and transit countries of migration in partnership with local, regional and international partners (EUGS 27-28). *Priority 4, cooperative regional orders*, sub-priority *a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa* underlines that for migration challenges it is important to prevent and solve conflicts, to promote development and respect of human rights in the region (EUGS 34-36). In the sub-priority *a closer Atlantic* and in the sub-priority *a connected Asia* it is stated that the European Union will deepen its cooperation on migration (EUGS 37, 38). In part 4, *from vision to action*, migration is treated in a *joined-up Europe* as an inherent unity of internal and external policies on humanitarian and development linkage to ensure coherence on migration efforts (EUGS 50).

To summarize, the EU's vision of migration management assumes *complex external measures for preventing and solving migration* problems. The vision foresees bilateral and multilateral cooperation tools. Moreover, the EU's partners post themselves as *transboundary aquifiers* of European values, principles and norms in migration area and beyond it. Around its borders, the *cross-border cooperation* is a key priority in enhancing both border and migration management.

Conclusions

The eastern borders of the European Union differentiate themselves among other borders in the North, South or West. These borders are *accessible* for *legal procedures*: traveling, shopping, asylum, etc.; and *permeable* for *illicit activities*: abuse of legal travel channels, illegal border crossings, smuggling of excise goods, etc.

The eastern borders of the European Union are mainly perceived as borders for *economic immigrants* coming from neighbouring and distant countries from the Eastern Partnership, the Community of Independent States and Asia.

People's mobility gives a *new shape* to migration through the eastern borders of the European Union, because it happens in *both directions*: non-EU nationals migrate in the European Union, and some citizens of the Baltic states move to Russia (usually it is the case with ethnic Russians).

The eastern border of the European Union witnesses *Europe's need for immigrants*, who comprise a valuable *social capital* in aging countries. In the same time, immigrants have *multiple* and *changeable identities* in a process ranging from *integration* to *transnationalism*. A *potential shift* in *migration paradigm* may occur due to the likely, the possible and the unknown development of immigrants' behaviour.

Migration management at EU eastern borders is supported by Partnership, Cooperation Agreements and Association Agreements and Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network enhancing advanced and efficient instruments designed for irregular migration. A more comprehensive and sustainable *engagement* of all parties is necessary. The visa regime should become *humane*.

As the eastern political and geopolitical borders ("Schlechtere Grenzen", bad border, incorrect border, unnatural border) of the European Union differ from the cultural and civilizational borders ("Rechte Grenzen", good border, correct border, natural border); this may be conducive to *potential conflicts* with the will or without the will of the European Union.

Having all the above united, *migration management* at EU eastern borders approaches resolutely to the *development* of *border dialogue* in an enlarged (global) format and also the development of *migration governance*, paraphrasing Francois Crepeau's words in the way that *migration* is a *journey seeking dignity*.

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